We study how natural resources can feed corruption and how this effect depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. Our game-theoretic model predicts that natural resources lead to an increase in corruption if the quality of the democratic institutions is relatively poor, but not otherwise. We use panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 99 countries to test this theoretical prediction. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource abundance and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. In particular, resource abundance is positively associated with corruption only in countries that have endured a nondemocratic regime for more than 60 percent of the years since 1956. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. They are also robust to various alternative measures of natural resources, corruption and the quality of the democratic institutions. These findings imply that democratization can be a powerful tool to reduce corruption in resource-rich countries.
Introduction
The finding that natural resource riches are a curse rather than a blessing may seem paradoxical at first and has lead to an extensive literature. 1 One of the main hypotheses put forward is that natural resource riches breed corruption, which, in turn, lower economic performance (e.g., Leite It suggests that corruption indeed tends to be higher in resource rich countries.
In this paper, we take a closer look at the relationship between resource abundance and corruption. In particular, we investigate both theoretically and empirically whether and how the quality of the democratic institutions affects this relationship.
In the theoretical part, we present a game between politicians and the people. There are some "good" politicians who primarily care about social welfare and possibly many more "bad" politicians who primarily care about the revenues they can generate by corrupt activities. The people prefer to have a good politician as their president, because such a president acts in their best interest. This provides an incentive for a bad incumbent president to mimic a good president and not to engage in corruption in order to improve the chances that he can remain in power. In equilibrium, a bad incumbent mimics a good incumbent if and only if the democratic institutions are sufficiently sound, i.e., if and only if there is sufficiently large difference between the probability that he can stay in office when supported by the people and the probability that he can stay in office without the 1 This finding goes back to Corden and Neary (1982) and has been popularized by Sachs and Warner (1995) . For an overview of this literature, see, e.g., Gylfason (2001) and Sachs and Warner (2001) , or van der Ploeg (2008).
2 As discussed below, there is a closely related hypothesis that natural resources lead to various forms of rent-seeking, which then lower economic performance.
3 That is, a low value of the corruption index implies a high level of corruption, and vice versa.
people's support. If this difference is small, a bad incumbent engages in corrupt activities. Moreover, the level of corruption that he chooses in this case increases in the natural resource abundance because resource windfalls are less sensitive to corruption than domestic production. Our model thus predicts that resource abundance increases corruption in countries with poor democratic institutions, but not in countries with comparatively better democratic institutions.
A brief look at the data provides already some support for this theoretical prediction.
In figure 2 , we split the sample into democratic and non-democratic countries. 4 It suggests that the negative relationship between resource abundance and the corruption index prevails in the sample of non-democratic countries, but not in the sample of democratic countries. In the empirical part of this paper, we test our theoretical prediction more thoroughly using a reduced form model and panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 99 countries. Our estimates confirm that the relationship between resource abundance and corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. In particular, we find that resource abundance is positively associated with corruption only in countries that have endured a non-democratic regime for more than 60 percent of the years since 1956.
Our basic results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects and various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of natural resources, corruption and the quality of the democratic institutions, as well as across different samples.
Our contribution in this paper is three-fold. First, we present a theoretical model that clearly demonstrates why we should expect the effect of resource windfalls on corruption to depend on the quality of the democratic institutions. Second, using a reduced form econometric model we show that the effect of resource abundance on corruption indeed depends on the level of democracy. Third, we estimate the threshold level of democracy below which natural resources have a positive effect on corruption.
The literature that focuses on the effect of natural resources on corruption is rather small. Leite and Weidman (2002) show that natural resources tend to increase corruption, and that this in turn lowers growth. Isham et al. (2005) find that this effect is most pronounced for "point source" natural resources such as oil, minerals, and plantation crops.
In a closely related paper to our empirical part, Aslaksen (2007) finds that oil increases corruption in the samples of both democratic and non-democratic countries, whereas minerals increase corruption only in the sample of non-democratic countries. There are a number of differences between our empirical approach and Aslaksen's. First, we use a long run measure of democracy while Aslaksen divides her sample between democracies and non-democracies using data from the year 1982. Second, we introduce an interactive term between natural resources and democracy and also control for the direct effects of democracy on corruption. Therefore, unlike Aslaksen, we do not divide our sample into democracies and non-democracies. Third, we also use a broad overall measure of resource abundance to capture the effects of all possible natural resources and do not distinguish between oil and minerals.
Corruption can be seen as one of many forms of rent-seeking. Our paper therefore is related to the literature which argues that natural resources may lower the economic performance because they foster rent-seeking activities (e.g., Lane and Tornell, 1996 , Tornell and Lane, 1999 , Baland and Francois, 2000 , and Torvik, 2002 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical model, and section 3 derives the equilibrium and some comparative static results. Section 4 discusses our empirical strategy and the data. Section 5 presents the empirical evidence and various robustness tests. Section 6 concludes.
The Model
There is an economy inhabited by an incumbent president, a challenger and the people.
The incumbent and the challenger are each a good type θ with probability α ∈ (0, 1) and a bad type θ with probability 1 − α. A politician's type is his private information, but α is common knowledge.
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There are two periods t ∈ {1, 2}. 6 In period one, the incumbent, who is in office for exogenous reasons, chooses the level of corruption c 1 ∈ [0, 1]. At the end of period one, the people then observe c 1 and support either the incumbent or the challenger. The people's decision determines the probability of the incumbent staying in office and, hence, the probability of the challenger getting into office. In period two, the politician in office again chooses the level of corruption c 2 ∈ [0, 1].
The economy consists of a production and a natural resource sector. Total income is thus given by the sum of domestic production A t and resource income Ω t . Domestic production A t is primarily determined by the individuals' labor-leisure choices and their decisions to accumulate physical and human capital and to invest in better technologies.
Corruption lowers the private returns on productive activities and, consequently, the incentives to work hard and to invest in physical and human capital and better technologies.
We thus assume that A t = A(c t ) with A ′ (c t ) ≤ 0 and, moreover, that A(c t ) is continuous,
The resource income Ω t , on the other hand, depends to a large extent on a country's resource endowment, which is exogenous and hence independent of the level of corruption. Corruption should thus have smaller disincentive effects on the resource income than it has on domestic production. For simplicity, we assume that Ω t = Ω ≥ 0 in all periods t. This assumption is however overly restrictive; all we need is that the resource income is less sensitive to corruption than domestic production.
The people's welfare is
+ Ω] in period t, and it decreases in corruption c t . When deciding which politician to support, the people maximize their expected welfare E(W 2 ), and we assume that they support the incumbent if they are indifferent between him and his challenger.
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A politician in office derives utility from different sources in each period t. On the one hand, he gets the corruption revenues
Similar to a Laffer curve, R(c t ) is a hump-shaped function of c t . 8 On the other hand, he may benefit for several reasons from high social welfare W t . First, his salary may depend on the performance of the official economy. Second, his status and influence in the international community may depend on the people's welfare and the economy's performance. Third, he may genuinely care about the people's well-being. We therefore assume that a politician of type θ gets the utility θW t from social welfare W t when in office, and that 0 < θ < θ. The reason for the first inequality is that any politician cares about his salary and his status; and the reason for the second inequality is that good politicians care more about the people's well-being than bad politicians. Consequently, the total instantaneous utility of a politician of type θ in office is
We further assume θ ≥ 1 > θ, such that good politicians in office care for all the various reasons more about social welfare than about corruption revenues while bad politicians care more about corruption revenues. For simplicity, we abstract from discounting and assume that politicians get zero utility when not in office.
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A key feature of the model are the democratic institutions which determine the extent to which the people can determine by whom they are governed, i.e., whether or not the incumbent is replaced by the challenger. We assume that the incumbent can remain in office with probability p if the people support him, and with probability q if the people support the challenger, where 0 ≤ q ≤ p ≤ 1. Democratic institutions are sound when the incumbent is likely to stay in office if and only if the people want him to stay, i.e., if p is high and q low. Democratic institutions are poor if the people's decision has little impact on the chances that the incumbent can stay in office, i.e., if the difference between p and q is small. 10 Hence, we view D ≡ p − q as a natural measure of the quality of the democratic 9 Note that the strategies of the people and the challenger are independent of the discount factor anyway. Note further that results would remain qualitatively unchanged even if politicians got some utility from social welfare when not in office. 10 Our approach of modeling democratic institutions allows for two different types of democratic failures. The high q-failure that an authoritarian incumbent is likely to stay in office even without the people's support, and the low p-failure that an incumbent in an anarchic environment is likely to be overthrown 7 institutions.
The appropriate solution concept for this dynamic game of incomplete information is Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE).
The Equilibrium
We start by solving the period two-subgame. The politician who is in office in period two has no strategic incentives and simply chooses the level of corruption c 2 that maximizes his instantaneous utility u 2 = u(c 2 ; θ). A good politician in office benefits more from high welfare W t than from high corruption revenues R t since θ > 1. He therefore chooses c 2 (θ) = 0. A bad politician in office, who cares more about R t since θ < 1, chooses c 2 (θ) =ĉ ≡ arg max ct u(c t ; θ). It follows:
Lemma 1 In period two, a good politician in office chooses c 2 (θ) = 0 and a bad politician in office chooses c 2 (θ) =ĉ, whereĉ satisfiesĉ ∈ (0, 1), increases in Ω and decreases in θ.
Proof: It follows from equation (1), θ > 1 and A ′ (c t ) < 0 that c 2 (θ) = 0. The first-order
determinesĉ. Note that the second-order condition,
guarantee an interior solutionĉ ∈ (0, 1). The implicit function theorem implies
. It thus follows from θ < 1, A ′ (c t ) ≤ 0 and Γ(c t ) < 0 that dĉ dΩ > 0 and
even when supported by the majority.
A bad politician in office therefore chooses a higher level of corruption in period two, the less he benefits from social welfare. Moreover, the level of corruption he chooses also increases in the resource income Ω. The reason is the following: A bad incumbent trades off the advantage of a higher level of corruption, which is a larger share of total income, against its disadvantage, which is a decrease in total income. This disadvantage however is decreasing in the resource income relative to domestic production, because the former is less sensitive to corruption than the latter. The level of corruption which maximizes a bad incumbent's utility therefore increases in the resource income.
When deciding whom to support at the end of period one, the people know that their welfare W 2 in period two will be higher with a good politician in office than with a bad politician in office. They therefore support the incumbent if and only if they believe that he is good with a higher probability than the challenger. That is, they support the incumbent if and only if their updated belief that he is good is µ(θ|c 1 ) ≥ α.
In period one, a good incumbent has two objectives when choosing the level of corruption c 1 . First, he would like his instantaneous utility u(c 1 ; θ) to be high. Second, he would like to ensure the people's support. Notice that u(c 1 ; θ) is maximized by c 1 (θ) = 0.
Further, notice that in any PBE a good incumbent must be reelected whatever his equilibrium choice c 1 (θ) is, because Bayes' rule implies that the people's updated beliefs must satisfy µ(θ|c 1 (θ)) ≥ α for all possible c 1 (θ) and c 1 (θ). Therefore, in equilibrium a good incumbent also receives the people's support when choosing his most preferred corruption level c 1 (θ) = 0. It seems thus reasonable to focus on the PBE in which he plays c 1 (θ) = 0.
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Given that a good incumbent plays c 1 (θ) = 0, a bad incumbent is in equilibrium supported by the people whenever he plays c 1 (θ) = 0, as the people then believe µ(θ|0) ≥ α. However, a bad incumbent does not get the people's support when he plays some c 1 (θ) > 0 in equilibrium, as the people then know that he must be a bad incumbent, i.e., µ(θ|c 1 (θ)) = 0. But when he is not supported by the people anyway, it is best for him to choose the level of corruption that maximizes his instantaneous utility u(c 1 ; θ). This is c 1 (θ) =ĉ. His expected lifetime utility from choosing c 1 (θ) =ĉ and not being supported is
while his expected lifetime utility from choosing c 1 (θ) = 0 and getting the people's support is
He therefore chooses c 1 (θ) =ĉ if Appendix A moreover shows that this PBE is the unique PBE that satisfies a plausible refinement on the people's off-equilibrium beliefs. We therefore focus on this PBE in the remainder of this section.
12 In the special case in which D = D ′ , a bad incumbent would be indifferent between choosing 0 andĉ and might therefore play a mixed strategy.
The PBE described in Proposition 1 is pooling if D ≥ D ′ , and separating otherwise. We now analyze how an increase in the resource income Ω affects corruption c 1 (θ) in the PBE described above, and how this effect depends on the democratic institutions D.
We thereby focus on the case of a bad incumbent and his corruption choice c 1 (θ), as a good Notice that it holds even more generally that the effect of natural resources on corruption depends on the quality of the democratic institutions. In particular, an increase in the resource income Ω raises the relative attractiveness of high corruptionĉ, measured by V (ĉ; θ) − V (0; θ), if and only if the democratic institutions D ≡ p − q are relatively poor. 13 The reasons are that the positive effect of a higher Ω on V (0; θ) increases in the probability p that the incumbent can stay in office when supported by the people; and that the positive effect on V (ĉ; θ) decreases in the probability q that he can stay in office without the people's support. 13 To see this, notice that the envelope theorem implies du(ĉ;θ) dΩ = (1−θ)ĉ+θ, and that
Therefore, our model predicts that when looking at a sample of countries differing in the quality of their democratic institutions, we should expect the effect of resource abundance on corruption to be negative in countries with poor democratic institutions, but neutral or even positive in countries with strong democratic institutions.
Empirical Strategy and Data
We use panel data which covers 99 countries over the period 1980 to 2004. 14 Our basic specification uses five year averages of our measures of corruption and income. Our main proxy measure of natural resources, the share of primary exports in GNP, is from the year 1970 and democracy is the fraction of years a country has been democratic since 1956.
To estimate whether the relationship between corruption and resource abundance varies systematically between democracies and non-democracies we use the following model:
where ci srt is the corruption index in country s in region r averaged over years t − 4 to t, α r is a region dummy variable covering seven regions of the world which controls for regional fixed effects, 15 β t is a year dummy variable which controls for time varying common shocks, sxp sr is the share of primary exports to GNP in country s in region r in the year 1970, D srt is our preferred democracy measure for country s in region r in years up to t, y srt is income per capita in country s in region r averaged over years t − 4 to t, and X srt is a vector of other control variables.
The main variable of interest is sxp sr . The point estimate of the effect of a change in sxp sr on ci srt is γ 1 + γ 3 D srt . Therefore γ 1 and γ 3 are our focus parameters. We expect γ 1 to be significantly negative and γ 3 to be significantly positive, because high values of the corruption index corresponds to low levels of corruption. This would imply that there is a threshold level of democracy below which the effect of resource abundance on the corruption index is negative (implying more corruption), and above which the effect is positive (implying less corruption).
We use the corruption index (ci srt ) from the Political Risk Services (PRS). This measure is predominantly an assessment of corruption within the political system. Therefore it includes actual and potential corruption, and it covers most common forms of corruption.
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The advantage of using this measure is threefold. First, it suits our purpose as it best captures our notion of corruption in the theoretical model where corruption is part of the political process. Second, it covers the time period 1980 to 2004 and the largest number of countries. This allows us to use panel data and minimize the sample selection bias both across countries and over time. Third, it is also widely used in the literature. 17 As an alternative we use the corruption perception index from Transparency International. This however reduces our sample size. The standard deviation of the corruption index is 1.4.
Our main natural resource measure (sxp sr ) is primary exports over GNP in 1970 and is from Sachs and Warner (1995) . Japan is the least resource intensive country with a share of primary exports to GDP of around 1 percent and Oman is the most resource intensive with a share of 89 percent. The mean resource abundance is 16 percent and the standard deviation is 0.16.
We choose sxp sr as our preferred measure of natural resources for the following reasons.
First, it is widely used in the resource curse literature. Hence it facilitates comparisons with previous studies. Second, it is also fairly wide in terms of country coverage. Therefore we are able to minimize the risk of sample selection bias. Third, by choosing sxp sr in 1970,
we are able to minimize the risk of an endogeneity related bias as it is quite unlikely that corruption in 1980 to 2004 will affect resource intensity in 1970. Nevertheless, we also use the share of mining; rents from energy, metals and forestry; subsoil wealth; and natural capital as alternative measures of resource abundance and our findings are reasonably robust to the use of these measures.
Our democracy measures (d srt and D srt ) are calculated using the Polity IV database.
We define a country to be democratic in a particular year if the variable POLITY2 is positive.
19 POLITY2 is defined as the difference between the democracy score and the autocracy score in the dataset, which both vary between 0 and 10 with 10 being the most democratic or most autocratic, respectively. Therefore, POLITY2 is an indicator of net democracy in the country. We define d srt as the fraction of years a country is democratic over a five year period, i.e., in the years t−4 to t. This is a short-run measure of democracy.
In principle, one could argue that besides democracy reducing corruption, there could also be a causal effect in the opposite direction. We therefore prefer using a long-run measure of democracy as opposed to five year averages. In particular, we define D srt as the fraction of years a country is democratic since 1956. We would expect reverse causality effects of corruption influencing democracy to be minimal with our long-run measure D srt .
20 19 Persson and Tabellini (2006) and many others also use this definition. 20 An alternative approach towards handling the potential endogeneity problem with democracy is to use the fraction of years a country was democratic between 1956 and 1980 as measure of democracy. This
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We find, e.g., that Algeria and Andorra are non-democratic over the entire period and that Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and others are democratic over this period. Between country variation (78 percent) in the data dominates over within country variation (22 percent). We also use the democracy scores from Freedom House and the democracy index from Cheibub and Gandhi (2004) as alternative measures of democracy.
We use per capita income, legal origin dummies, and several other additional control variables in our study. Detailed definitions and sources of all variables are available in Appendix B. Table 1 reports descriptive statistics of the major variables used in the study.
Endogeneity due to sxp sr may not be a cause of concern for us since it seems unlikely Another possibility is that a high correlation between sxp sr and D srt could inflate the standard errors of our estimates. Ross (2001) documents that natural resource abundance and oil in particular has antidemocratic properties. This may bring in issues of multicollinearity in our specification. We find that the correlation between sxp sr and D srt is -0.28 and the correlation between sxp sr * D srt and D srt is 0.63. The magnitude of these correlations is not large enough to cause any serious problem of multi-collinearity.
Finally, we tackle the issue of omitted variables by controlling for unobserved region specific heterogeneity, time varying common shocks, and additional covariates that are approach is somewhat symmetric to our handling of endogeneity with sxp sr , which is an initial (1970) value. The disadvantage though is that we lose all time series variation in the data and estimate a cross-section model. Our main results are nevertheless robust to this approach. 21 There is however little consensus on institutional persistence. See, e.g., expected to influence the level of corruption. Table 2 reports the estimate of equation (3) . In column 1 we look at the unconditional correlation between natural resources and the corruption index. We notice that there is a negative relationship and the coefficient estimate is statistically significant. This suggests that natural resources are associated with high levels of corruption. 22 But this association may be driven by omitted factors (such as income, political structure, legal structure, culture, geography, time varying common shocks etc.) influencing both natural resources and corruption. To tackle this issue in columns 2 and 3 we add per capita income, legal origin dummies, regional dummies, year dummies, and the short-run democracy measure d srt . We notice that the negative relationship survives however the magnitude of the coefficient falls. To estimate how the effect of natural resources on corruption depends on democratic institutions, in column 4 we add the interaction term sxp sr * d srt . We notice that the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. Natural resources feed corruption if and only if the country is democratic in less than 2.9 years of the last five years.
Empirical Evidence
Since d srt is a short-run measure of democracy, it is possible that our estimates in column 4 suffer from reverse causality problems. To account for this problem, in column 5
we use our long-run democracy measure D srt which is the fraction of years the country had been democratic since 1956. We notice that both the negative coefficient on sxp sr and the positive coefficient on interactive variable sxp sr * D srt survive. In an average country, the effect of an increase in the natural resources on the corruption index is negative (implying an increase in corruption) if and only if the country has spent less than 40 percent of 22 Note that higher values of the corruption index imply less corruption.
its years since 1956 as a democracy. To put this into perspective, the model explains one third of the actual difference in corruption between Nigeria and the Philippines -two low income resource exporting economies. 23 In column 6, we replace regional dummies by country dummies and find that the coefficients on sxp sr , D srt and sxp sr * D srt are no longer statistically significant. This implies that our results are mainly due to cross-country variations. It is however not surprising that within-country variation plays a minor role given that our explanatory variables are either time invariant (sxp sr ) or highly persistent (D srt ). Overall, the effect is also jointly significant. In column 2, we test whether the effect is predominant among any particular country group. Again we do this by allowing the effect to vary across different country groups based on income. We notice that the effect is predominant among high income countries (with per capita income $10,000 or more) and very low income countries (with per capita income $2,500 or less). However, the F-test reveals that the effect is jointly significant across all country income groups.
In table 4 we add further covariates into our specification to address the issue of omitted variables. In column 1 we add ethnic fractionalization as an additional control because ethnically fractionalized countries tend to be more corrupt (Mauro, 1995) . The negative coefficient on sxp sr and the positive coefficient on sxp sr * D srt survive. In columns 2 and 3 we add total official development assistance (ODA) and ODA from the largest bilateral donor, the United States, as additional controls because there is evidence that foreign aid feeds corruption (Knack, 2001, Alesina and Weder 2002) . Our basic results survive in both cases. In columns 4 -9 we control for real exchange rate distortions, black market premiums, FDI, the Sachs and Warner trade liberalization index, trade shares, and media freedom respectively to check whether these omitted variables are driving our results. Our basic results survive in all instances. In column 10 we control for the statistically significant additional control variables and our basic results survive this test. We also notice that the statistically significant estimated threshold levels of democracy for a positive effect of natural resources on the corruption index varies within the range of 0.35 and 0.51 which is not significantly different from our preferred estimate of 0.40. estimates are robust to the use of these variables. 27 In column 5 we replace the corruption index from PRS with the corruption perception index from Transparency International.
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Our results survive this test. Hence, our results seem to be reasonably robust to alternative measures.
Overall these empirical findings support our theoretical prediction that natural resources foster corruption in countries with poor democratic institutions, but make cor- 
Conclusions
We study the mechanism through which natural resources feed corruption and the role of democratic institutions in this process. Using a game-theoretic model we show that natural resources increase corruption if and only if the quality of the democratic institutions is below a certain threshold level. To test this prediction, we use a reduced form model and panel data covering the period 1980 to 2004 and 99 countries. We notice that our theoretical prediction is supported by the data. In particular, resource abundance is positively associated with corruption only in countries that have endured a non-democratic regime for more than 60 percent of the years since 1956. Our main results hold when we control for the effects of income, time varying common shocks, regional fixed effects, legal origin and various additional covariates. It is also robust to various alternative measures of natural resources, corruption and the quality of the democratic institutions.
These findings imply that resource-rich countries have a tendency to be corrupt because resource windfalls encourage their governments to engage in rent-seeking. But this tendency can be checked if the governments are accountable towards its people. Political accountability without doubt is higher in countries with a long history of democracy;
for example, in the resource-rich democratic countries Australia and Norway. Therefore, a major implication of our results is that democratization can be a powerful tool for reducing corruption in resource-rich countries.
Appendix A This appendix introduces a plausible refinement on the people's off equilibrium beliefs and shows that this refinement guarantees the uniqueness of the PBE characterized in Proposition 1.
Definition The PSE refinement is satisfied when the people's belief after observing some c 1 =c which no incumbent θ ∈ {θ, θ} should play in equilibrium is 1. µ(θ|c) = 1 if playingc is equilibrium-dominated 28 for θ, but not for θ; and µ(θ|c) = 0 if playingc is equilibrium-dominated for θ, but not for θ.
2. µ(θ|c) = α if playingc is not equilibrium-dominated for any θ ∈ {θ, θ}. Proof: We prove Lemma 2 by contradiction. Therefore, suppose there exists a PBE with c 1 (θ) > 0 which satisfies the PSE refinement. To prevent incumbent θ from deviating and playing c 1 (θ) = 0, it is necessary that the people support the challenger when observing c 1 = 0, which requires µ(θ|0) < α. But playing c 1 = 0 is never equilibrium-deviated for incumbent θ (while it may or may not be equilibrium-deviated for incumbent θ). The PSE refinement thus requires µ(θ|0) ≥ α. This is a contradiction. Hence, there exists no PBE with c 1 (θ) > 0 which satisfies the PSE refinement.
Lemma 2 and Proposition 1 imply:
Proposition 3 The PBE characterized in Proposition 1 is the unique PBE that satisfies the PSE refinement.
Proof: It follows from Lemma 2 that no PBE with c 1 (θ) > 0 satisfies the PSE refinement, and from Proposition 1 that there is no other PBE with c 1 (θ) = 0.
Appendix B B.1 Data description
Corruption Index (c srt ): A 7 point (0-6) index with higher values indicating less corruption. Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. Sample years are every fifth year from 1980 to 2004. srt D is the fraction of years democratic since 1956 from Polity IV. Natural Resources is the Sachs and Warner measure of share of primary exports in GNP in 1970. High Income is a dummy for per capita GDP in 2000 being 10, 000 constant 1996 international dollars or more; Middle Income for between 5,000 and 10,000; Low Income for between 2,500 and 5,000; Very Low Income for less than 2,500. The F-test is the joint test of significance of the interaction terms between Natural Resources, Democracy, and Year Dummies (for column 1) and interaction terms between Natural Resources, Democracy, and Income Dummies (for column 2). Notes: ***, **, and * indicates significance level at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively against a two sided alternative. Figures in the parentheses are cluster standard errors and they are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and arbitrary intra-group correlation. All the regressions reported above are carried out without an intercept. 
